Sambusa za Tanzania (courtesy: kumbukumbu cards)
Monday, 30 November 2020
Invited to Taste Kilimanjaro African Perth EATS @ Community Mirrabooka Markets
Join a Taste of Kilimanjaro-African EATS @ Community Mirrabooka Markets. As year 2020 comes to a close, welcome to sample international food including our Kilimanjaro African Food, featured by a Tanzanian women group of Perth, WA.
Occasion: The initiative is part of the Community Mirrabooka Markets featuring International Food; Multicultural Arts & Crafts; Local Services; Family Fun & Entertainment in a COVID-safe set up.
(Pilau photo image Courtesy: Swahili recipies1.blogspot.com)
Great Tanzanian culinary EATS on serve not to be missed – the famous Swahili Pilau with Kachumbari, mouth-watering sambusa bites, the delectable Vitumbua (Tanzanian Sweet Rice Buns) and much more.
Delectable vitumbua (rice buns) (Courtesy: Image: gramho.com)
When: 17th December 2020
Time: 4pm – 9pm
Where: The Square Mirrabooka, Yirrigan Drive Carpark
Contact: kilimanjaro.africanfood@gmail.com ; pendobtm@gmail.com
Future Catering Orders: The Kilimanjaro African Food takes catering orders for private and business functions via kilimanjaro.africanfood@gmail.com
Tuesday, 13 October 2020
Victoria Hotel Quarantine Governance & Compliance Concerns
Intro
The
Victoria Hotel Quarantine saga has raised eyebrows amidst unfolding Board of
Inquiry revelations [Inquiry Link]. I browsed through some of the transcripts and picked up a couple of concerning
themes. Here is my take so far:
- Funding, governance, and compliance structures were assembled without adequate regard to the function of Government entities and delegates vested with Public Health and Wellbeing Act powers and carriage of the Commonwealth Biosecurity Act 2015 provisions.
- The DHSS agency lead role was sidelined without clear appreciation of potential ramifications for infection disease control
- Procurement structures and performance reporting lines relating to Covid-19 infection control are not connected
- The notion of shared accountability and blurred roles feature strongly
List of evidence transcripts from the Inquiry drawn upon for this article can be located at the end of this piece.
 |
| Courtesy: AAP cited on SBS |
Governance structures excluded key public health officials
- The Chief Health Officer and public health experts were largely not included in critical high State strategic planning such as Operation Soteria.
- Public health and communicable disease expert staff excluded from designing of Operation Soteria. They had no ‘involvement of Public Health Command in Operation Soteria’, noted one senior health bureaucrat. ‘The Operation Soteria meetings I attended did not involve the [Public Health Command] initially, and did seem to me to focus heavily on logistics considerations.’
- Failure to adequately include key health officials in high level decision-making mechanisms led to ‘lack of a unified plan for [Operation Soteria]’ and deprived opportunity for the Health Department to bring to bear a lead expertise role in underpinning ‘policy and set of processes to manage the healthcare and welfare of detainees’.
- The frustration experienced by the somewhat sidelined health leads is illustrated in the evidence before the Board of Inquiry. They asked those controlling pandemic State structures above them in these terms: “The Chief Health Officer and Deputy Chief Health Officer require a single plan to be produced for review by 10am tomorrow morning Friday 10 April. This plan must include....we have some dot points….The plan will need to show all processes and policy decisions, and manage health and safety of detainees.”
- A minor concession was made to their demand, they were allowed a “Public Health Command liaison” – a liaison status in their view “is not the same as having direct oversight and direct view of the daily challenges and operational complexities of that program… the public health view and the public health expertise with respect to that would have been beneficial to be more directly engaged”.
- As the Chief Health Officer had no operational line management responsibility over Operational Soteria, he says he only became aware of deficiencies in infection control after an outbreak.
So in looking for what went wrong in Victoria
leading to hundreds of deaths, economic and social disruption, we also need to
be asking what exactly the Victoria Government intended to be achieved by
excluding these health officials from these critical planning structures??
It is also fair to ask that Victoria Health
Department teams are actually the very personnel with delegated authority to
help secure community safety through powers vested through the State Public Health and Wellbeing Act and also
the Commonwealth Biosecurity Act 2015.
When the very senior bureaucrats and
politicians in the State overlook or circumvent the roles vested with
professional experts and street-level-bureaucracy, how are these officers going
to effectively carry their statutory role when not sufficiently involved in
designing critical operational underpinnings?
Evidence
at Board of Inquiry cites the Crisis Council of Cabinet as a decision-making
entity that formulates Victoria’s Covid-19 pandemic policy response, including
resource allocation. So what exactly did this Crisis Council of Cabinet
authorise in relation to Operation Soteria funding?
The Victoria Expenditure Review Committee allocated $80m to the Department of Jobs to manage the Hotel Quarantine among other things. Who sits in this entity and how does it all fit in in terms of past and future funding allocation decisions they make?
Shared Accountability and Blurred Statutory Compliance
A
constant claim made in some of the evidence before the Board of Inquiry that
the decisions made are justified under the notion of “shared accountability’’. There are benefits working
across-government, but there are fundamental questions raised in the Victoria
Quarantine Hotel saga:
- Why ignore compliance accountability under the State Public Health and Wellbeing Act when setting up structures of shared responsibility? Surely top of your mind when you are bringing together interagency parties involves including relevant health delegates already mandated in their departmental roles to fulfil responsibilities connected to their statutory role? You will have others drawn in for sure from across governments as appropriate.
- The Victoria Government did not designate the Chief Health Officer as State Controller – thus failing to comply with its own legislative Act in managing a pandemic. Is this not odd when dealing with a pandemic, and when the legislation requires this official to act as the State Controller?
- In giving evidence, Minister Mikakos seemed unperturbed that the State Chief Health Officer was sidelined from occupying the role of a State Controller during a pandemic and says “it was not an issue of concern…not live issue”. What are the implications for statutory compliance in public administration? Why support the blurring of roles at such a critical time? On the other hand, are there other reasons the Minister was aware of that we in the public are not privy to?
- Confusion persist about the role of DHHS as lead coordinating agency from role of the State Control Centre as a coordinating mechanism and decision-making agency
- DHSS Departmental Secretary Ms Peake has a different understanding of what is meant by DHSS being a lead agency. She says DHSS had a role only to a point. She says pandemic issues go beyond Victoria jurisdiction. Oddly though, she does not unpack the statutory responsibilities expected of her Department under Victoria Public Health and Wellbeing Act powers or the powers vested with her Department under the Commonwealth Biosecurity Act 2015.
- The Minister of Health says she had not been briefed or read Operational Plan Soteria till Rydges and Stamford Hotel outbreaks – but it was a big pandemic response thing happening.
- Minister says was not involved in development, consultation or authorisation of the quarantine model. And says “it was a multiagency response involving many Departments and agencies, and I would have expected them to work together on these issues.’
- Clearly evidence show the Department of Health was not driving Operation Soteria, yet the Plan says the Department of Health is the control agency and ‘’responsible for oversight and coordination’’.
- Is there also a confusion and blurring of roles between what the Minister of Health is expected to lead and what the Emergency Management Commissioner is meant to do in times of pandemic??
- It turns out the need to outline clear pandemic response structures and leadership was identified as far back as 2011 but the State of Victoria has not addressed this issue. Is it going to be addressed this time?
- Lack of clarification for these basic definitional issues has ramifications for future agency role clarity, transparency, collaboration and accountability.
- Evidence given at the Board of Inquiry cites the Crisis Council of Cabinet as a decision-making entity that formulates Victoria’s Covid-19 pandemic policy response, including resource allocation. So what exactly did this Crisis Council of Cabinet authorise in relation to Operation Soteria funding? Who is part of this Council?
- The Victoria Expenditure Review Committee allocated $80m to the Department of Jobs to manage the Hotel Quarantine among other things. Who sits in this entity?
- Emergency Management Act – is there potential for some politician in the future to do away with other important legislative and operational compliance requirements in the name of the Emergency Management Act? How are they to be kept accountable? How will the public be able to follow lines of accountability? As we have seen in the Victoria saga, no single top bureaucrat or politician owns up to the hotel quarantine saga!
Procurement Structures Unconnected to Performance Reporting Lines
The Victoria purchasing and performance
reporting structures for the Hotel Quarantine Program oddly neglected the lead
and oversight statutory role expected of a Health Department.
- Procurement governance set up did not allow the Department of Health from effectively undertaking performance administration and monitoring activities in a manner you would expect under any Government Purchasing and Contracting Policies and Guidelines.
- As DHHS lead role was sidelined or ignored, in effect, procurement arrangements did not sufficiently embed operational supply, capabilities and performance arrangements aligned with expectations under the Public Health and Wellbeing Act powers and provisions under the Commonwealth Biosecurity Act 2015.
- It seems the Victoria Department of Jobs, Precincts and Regions who managed the hotel tender funds did the best they could leading in procuring hotels, drawing up supply contract specifications and administration, including of security guards as assigned. But authorities higher up above the Department did not take into account that to manage contracts effectively should have allowed DHSS a lead role at least in procurement, administration, performance monitoring and support of contracted suppliers in connection to training, PPE, and cleaning.
- As already noted there was role confusion and blurring of roles. In the context of procurement and monitoring performance a response from Department of Jobs illuminates this point: “Well, certainly from a DJPR perspective we were certainly responsible for the operational elements of, you know, functions that were relating to DJPR. But to the best of my knowledge, our Department did not have any involvement on health-related matters.”
- The issue here is structural. If decision-makers further higher up place procurement responsibility with one agency and then expect another agency to be responsible for performance without clear management lines of responsibility, this is odd and really puts operational workers in difficult situation.
- In my view, there is nothing wrong for procurement method to embed job-creation as secondary objective. But the highest levels of bureaucracy and political leadership needed to ensure intergovernmental structures and processes did not sideline primary compliance objectives under the Public Health and Wellbeing Act powers & the Commonwealth Biosecurity Act 2015.
Government Transferred Risk to
Contracted Parties
The Victoria Government transferred risk to its suppliers without adequate attention to third party capacity or support measures. This is indicated in insufficient arrangements for training, PPE and cleaning necessary to minimise the spread of coronavirus by the returning travellers and workers at hotel sites to the rest of the community.
Courtesy: AAP as cited on ABC
A
seemingly well-meaning purchasing officer from DJPR explained that:
“To my knowledge, the cleaning, you know, was --- there
was a contractual obligation on the part of the supplier to ensure that they
met whatever the nationally accepted standards were for COVID-19. So, from my
perspective, it was not something that I was administering actively in that
sense. We were in contact with hotels on a regular basis to discover whether
there were any issues that were of concern. But I think I had referred earlier
on that a lot of the day-to-day issues were actually managed on the ground
between the on-site management teams from both DHHS and DJPR and the hotels.”
Perhaps
the transfer of disease infection control risk to the contracted third parties
was not intentional – at least to the extent that we can’t expect Department of
Jobs bureaucrats to be thoroughly versed with infection control – why would
they? But we would expect Ministers and senior bureaucrats higher up in
Government to be thoughtful about which Government entities are vested with
funding, contracting and performance monitoring of matters involving infectious
or communicable diseases.
I
suspect there are stacks of Government Purchasing Policies and Guidelines they
could have used to refine their purchasing processes. This is whether they
wanted to use a preferred panel contracting arrangements or any framework
allowable under their Purchasing Policy. And also whether they included
job-creation as a secondary objective or not. They still needed to be
transparent in their processes and follow due diligence at least with
well-planned support measures for contracted third parties.
We
can’t assume at this point that a lesson is learnt about went wrong at the
level of purchasing. For those familiar with contracting and tendering policies,
you will certainly be interested in looking at the evidence given by various
parties about how the funding was allocated to DJPR in the first place.
I
was a bit troubled that the then Minister of Health and her Health Departmental
Secretary appear not to reflect on the risks either given that the funds to
manage infection control at hotel sites were not allocated directly to their
Department. We also now know the Minister of Health had no say in the matter and
says she didn’t even know about Operation Soteria before interagency
stakeholders designed it!
And
where does the Victoria Crisis Cabinet Council and also the Expenditure Review
Committee sit in all this in respect of decisions they made about funding
allocation?
This
story is still unfolding, so conclusive remarks will be premature. But what has
emerged from this inquiry so far presents a lot of food for thought.
As it unfolds……
Lately
we saw resignations of the Head of Department of Premier & Cabinet and also
the DHSS Minister. There are still issues of accountability and transparency to be unpacked. As
the story unfolds, and with hundreds of lives lost in Victoria, it is a puzzle
as to:
- Why the Chief Health Officer was not designated as State Controller as per legislative requirement in managing a pandemic
- Why key health officials were excluded from critical planning structures?
- Why did the Victoria Government use procurement structures that were not directly linked to performance reporting lines?
- Does the Victoria Government acknowledge that it transferred risk to contracted private security agencies instead of allowing DHSS to take a lead role in setting up and managing infection controls at hotel sites? Regardless whether private security agencies were involved or not, DHSS should have led with direct performance reporting lines.
The
notion of shared responsibility may come under scrutiny, especially where it
can be consciously or unconsciously used to blur statutory compliance,
in the process disrupting transparency and accountability.
References
Victoria
Covid-19 Hotel Quarantine Inquiry
https://www.quarantineinquiry.vic.gov.au/hearings-transcripts
Transcript of Day 10
Hearing 31 August 2020 (Menon)
Transcript of Day 18
Hearing 16 September 2020 (Sutton)
Transcript of Day 22
Hearing 22 September 2020 (Phemister, Peake)
Transcript of Day 23
Hearing 23 September 2020 (Peake)
Transcript of Day 24
Hearing 24 September 2020 (Mikakos)
Transcript of Day 25 Hearing 25 September 2020 (Andrews)
Tuesday, 15 September 2020
Israel Normalise Relations with Key Neighbours, Remaking the Middle East – Stop Press!
What a year we have in 2020 – wow, so many unexpected things are happening at an unbelievable speed! Who would have predicted this year we would see Israel normalise relations with the United Arab Emirates and also the country of Bahrain!
 |
Caption: Israel Flag, Courtesy: countryflags.com |
 |
| Caption: UAE Flag, Courtesy: countryflags.com |
In an era where so many other world events are unfolding with such acceleration, this Middle Eastern turn is certainly worth a note.
 |
| Caption: Bahrain Flag, Courtesy: countryflags.com |
Official sources stated Israel and the UAE will now ‘exchange embassies and ambassadors, and begin cooperation across the board and on a broad range of areas, including tourism, education, healthcare, trade, and security.’ See source Whitehouse Statements
As commonly known,
Israel normalised relation with Egypt way back in 1978 under the Camp David
Accords. It also improved its relations with Jordan two decades and a half ago.
Whatever the driving
factors for this latest shift, you got to say this is an epic story unfolding
in our lifetime. And who knows where it might lead! In the meantime, my mind recalls we are asked
to ‘pray for the peace of Jerusalem’ (so speak shalom/ salaam).
Monday, 24 August 2020
Bureaucracy on Spotlight – Ruby Princess & Victoria Covid-19 Hotel Quarantine Inquiries
The Victoria Hotel COVID
Quarantine fiasco and the Ruby Princess disembarkation debacle bring the workings
of bureaucracy into spotlight. This saga agonised Australia and perhaps reinforced
some of our regional hard border mentalities. Let’s face it - if bureaucracy
makes certain decisions that don’t make sense, who can blame the public for exercising
a healthy degree of cynicism?
I point out examples
from both State and Federal bureaucracies. Let’s start with disembarkation
issues.
The first thing that
struck me is the story that NSW and the Feds have arrangements that apparently
require a Federal Border Force Officer to interpret medical reports and make
decisions about traveller movements in place of a qualified Public Health
Officer.
People hear this stuff and they
think are you kidding me? What sense can a Border Force Officer make of medical
lingo? How does this help with Australia health safety? Where are NSW Health
authorities?
The Commissioner of Inquiry
into the Ruby Princess Cruiser rightly put the responsibility on NSW Health
Department. Not even the “Yes Minister” British classic would have prepared us
for what was to play out in real life leading to 663 known COVID infections and 28
dead. First NSW Health Department did not follow its own regulation framework –
it chose not to require the Ruby Princess passengers to isolate. As the
Commissioner of Inquiry put it:
13.64 The directive to allow passengers to onward travel interstate and internationally after disembarkation on 19 March did not appropriately contemplate or comply with the terms of the Public Health Order that came into effect on 17 March, which required all cruise ship passengers entering the State from any other country to isolate themselves in suitable accommodation for 14 days. Under the terms of the Public Health Order, the State Government should have arranged suitable accommodation for all passengers who were not residents of the State. See Inquiry Link
NSW Health Department
also allowed passengers to take further travel despite knowing some of these
travellers were either infected or close contact of those infected beggars
belief. In turn the travellers infected many other people as they journeyed on
interstate and around the world. The Inquiry Report observes:
‘’13.65 The fact sheet linked to an email sent to passengers at 10:46am on 20 March incorrectly advised that they were permitted to continue with onward travel, despite being identified as “close contacts” of a confirmed COVID-19 case. Although this advice was corrected by NSW Health by the evening of 21 March, it was at that stage too late to prevent a considerable number of interstate and international passengers from onward travelling, including some passengers who were symptomatic during transit.” See Inquiry Link
But also bear in mind
that even many passengers had no idea that their luxury cruise liner had some
infected people. So sadly many of them infected others unaware of their own
situation – this is because NSW Health did not promptly warn them that they
were disembarking from an infected ship.
Now back to Federal
bureaucracy: Australian Border Force refused to provide Qantas and Virgin
Airlines with the Ruby Princess Passenger Manifest despite requests from these
airlines. In other words, if relevant airline staff had access to the list of
passengers from the Ruby Princess they would have prevented them from boarding
aircrafts and spreading Coronavirus interstate and around the world.
According to the ABC,
“Six months after the Ruby Princess
docked in Sydney, a formal process for sharing passenger manifests with those
who need them has not been established.” ABC Link
If this is the case,
what is senior Federal and State bureaucracy doing to ensure that health information
is shared on ‘need-to-know base’ where broader public safety is at risk?
Then there are issues
about bureaucracy not prioritising prompt swab-processing and communicating
results from the Ruby Princess. And just letting passengers transfer to airport
terminals and the like; then raising alarm when it is almost too late and most
people have long moved on. Even after the Inquiry, this does not make sense.
People puzzle that how does this stuff happen given some obvious public sector
standards and so called values?
Is this the same healthcare
bureaucracy expected to support manage safe inter-state border movements if
these are opened prematurely? Follow the drift?
Common folk look at
the Ruby Princess disembarkation mismanagement - even before the Inquiry Report
came out, and they reason that it was a disaster waiting to happen. Yet
bureaucracy took the view that “privacy” was absolute. Why didn’t NSW State
Health request passengers to sign consent forms for health info to be shared on
“need-to-know basis”? Why is this situation different from patient health info
that is shared everyday around the country on “need-to-know basis”?
Individual safety we
presume is one of the most paramount value or principle in public health. So
when healthcare bureaucrats make perplexing decisions leading to substantial covid-19
spread as was the case with the Ruby Princess, it is no wonder people remain
troubled. Why did bureaucracy not exercise its professional responsibility? Are
we to take it that this was a political decision and bureaucrats had no say? If
not, what went wrong?
Again when people
think about border closures or relaxing them, I presume this kind of saga comes
to mind. It has become part of our archaeology of memory for now.
Disembarkation issues
are not isolated. Back in July the media reported about Jetstar passengers who
arrived in NSW from Melbourne, disembarked and headed home without covid-19
screening. Apparently NSW State Health Officials were not available. Here is SMH Story Link
Aren’t these bureaucrats meant to be at the airport to screen passengers in a timely way? Were they swamped with workloads? Are they under-resourced? What measures are in place across other airports across the country to ensure Public Health Officers conduct their traveller screenings in a timely way and monitor that no arrivals fall through the cracks?
On the Victoria Hotel
Quarantine saga - I was listening to the unfolding news. Among other things it
sounds as if the quarantine roles are so fragmented and confused.
Now, I understand
some of our neo-liberal bureaucratic requirements to put out services to
tenders and contracts. Surely if Victoria Health Department wished to fragment
the operational tasks that way; then those dividing up these tasks will need to
be across the nitty gritty of your tender specifications and capabilities of contracted
external parties.
If authorities
involved in business contracting and compliance in delivery have limited idea
of what was to occur at hotel quarantine sites from a health point of view, no
wonder there were gaps in infection controls.
It looks like against
the background of neo-liberal bureaucratic structures, perhaps bureaucrats
focussed on doing their own fragmented bits. It is not even clear from the
Victoria Premier’s press conferences there was no Lead Agency to provide
oversight on health matters that cut across the board amongst multiple
Government Departments involved at Hotel Quarantine sites.
As we move forward we
can now only watch how the workings of bureaucracy evolve. It still seems a puzzle
given the role confusion, dysfunctional diffusion, role fragmentation and lack
of trained professional support and oversight (ala untrained security guards).
To this you can add the seemingly avoidance of sensitive responsibilities (ala doing
nothing just letting people disembark from the Ruby Princess regardless of
consequences).
On one hand they say
accountability and probity is part of what drives modern bureaucracy. Yet in
both the Ruby Princess and Victoria Hotel Quarantine situation, we missed the
mark. Perhaps The Commissioner of Inquiry into Ruby Princess is right to puzzle
that what recommendations can he make when the findings are that these public
servants need to actually do their basic job?
The other question of
course is the environment these public servants find themselves in – who is to
say. Are they able to do their job properly and survive? We live in a complex
world.
Oops, one more
thing. The Commissioner of Inquiry into the Victoria Hotel Quarantine saga draws attention that the Victoria Government
named its Hotel Quarantine Plan as “Operation Soteria”. She goes on to say “Soteria is the Greek goddess of rescue and safety” See Day 3 Proceedings, Page 22, section 40. At this point I chuckled a little and likely inside trembled, thought to myself run fast to the safety in the God of Abraham, eternal and temporal.
Links
Links
Special
Commission of Inquiry into the Ruby Princess, New South Wales Australia
Victoria Covid-19 Hotel Quarantine Inquiry
Monday, 17 August 2020
Housing Ownership Debate & Subsidies
Australia has seen a growing debate about housing ownership and a claim that older Australians had it easy – and that should be blamed for intergenerational inequity. I am keen to touch on flaws of this claim – I am also keen to draw attention to current Government housing funding subsidies for people interested in housing ownership.
There are Government schemes across Australia put
in place to give people a chance to pursue a dream of owning their own home. At
the moment substantial additional money has been allocated to extra housing
ownership subsidy programs as part of economic stimulus following the COVID
disruption. I summarised resource links at the end of the article.
It has been estimated that some people could get as
much as $69,000 and others up to $45,000 in total if they take advantage of the
COVID stimulus economic housing package and the existing First Home Owners
schemes. That is a lot of money for employed folk wishing to own their first
home.
Clearly there are valid questions about housing
inequality evidenced in homelessness and limited social housing for vulnerable
groups. That deserves a separate article at another time. So now I turn my
attention against the ageist assertions blaming elderly people.
I find it puzzling when I hear commentators
claiming that older Australians managed themselves into home ownership with
less effort. I think really?
First it is not clear which exact older Australian
group they are blaming. Is it the older people now probably in aged care that
missed out on public funded University education? Is it the very older women
who back in the day were legally prevented from public sector jobs the minute
they got married with impacts on lifelong earnings and savings?
Are we blaming the same older Australians who did
not have the right to receive universal compulsory superannuation? We can’t
forget that many Australians had no access to super until mid-1992. As of 1974
only 32% of Australia’s workforce had access to super. And of these only 15%
were females. https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BN/0910/ChronSuperannuation
The point I am trying to make here is that a lot of
those elderly people missed out on other things that we now take for granted
like university education, superannuation, and even Government jobs that once
largely excluded many women!
Many didn’t give up; they build on what they had
and the opportunities that they secured. So to simply blame these people for
vagaries of modern capitalism or the project of neo-liberalism seems to me a
bit of a stretch!!
Then there are plenty of immigrants who came to
Australia since the late 1970s from all over the world, many with nothing more
than a suitcase. Many have toiled in low end jobs. Some have prospered running
market gardens, restaurants, and involvement in mainstream economy. Try telling
these people who worked no end to put food on the table for their families that
they should be blamed for intergenerational inequities. It may not make sense.
I think people could be excused for thinking hey,
we may need more advances in sociological explanations (laugh out loud),
because a sweeping blame on older generations just doesn’t add up.
Specifically on housing, there are any older
Australians who started in fibro housing and others albeit with a brick façade.
Many home owners don’t get a mortgage to buy a house where they could live
forever - they stick with a property for three, five or say 10 years. They
shift to a better house or suburb after building greater equity in the house.
In the past we have regarded building equity in your house as important part of
a saving strategy – the equity allowed you to get an even better place – maybe
another mortgage!
They got another mortgage? Housing was partly seen
as a saving strategy as much a form of upward mobility.
My memory takes me back to the 1980s and 1990s
as house renovations exploded. Holiday time and long weekends were
partly spent by some doing painting projects, doing bathroom tiling and kitchen
upgrades. You needed a bit of money to get improvement supplies. Remember WA
Salvages (before Bunnings) for renovation supplies to make your little place
look a ‘million dollars’? Time invested and work done increased house
value.
People were busy ripping off old carpets and
polishing their timber floors. It all took money, but it increased house value.
A middle aged lady in the housing market once told me ‘she spent money to make
money’ (laugh out loud, but I did understand her logic).
And wow, the amazing house extensions people built on their blocks. Sometimes extensions costed as
much as the original structure. Then the fences that had to be redone, timber
and fibro fences of post-ward era falling, Colorbond and Zincalume were in. Not
cheap.
It will be remiss not to include the home gardening explosion that
improved property values. So much gardening upgrades were made - plants bought
and bartered – swap meet markets for early risers. Landscaping for those who
could afford came in the mix. Time and money always gradually invested to bring
gardens to new levels. And it all helped add value to properties.
Some will remember suburbs that did not have sewerage connections.
You were required to pay to install a new sewerage connection and decommission
old localised tank systems. And you couldn’t legally sell a property till a
connection is done. Talk about cost of living! I know older people who only
made their lifetime trip to Europe later in life. They were happy with local
holidays, but certainly paid their mortgage.
The cost of money as in mortgage interest rates is
also a big factor in talking about cost of housing. Needless to mention that
the 1990s had seen interest rates ranging from 11% to 17%. Looking at comparative
products on banking sites and Government housing loans today they roughly range
from 2% to 4.6% interest. How does this compare to the 1990s 11% to 17%
interest burden?
There are always
risks with getting any mortgage to
own a home. As in the recession of the early 1990s, some people lost
properties. In recent years some well-paid folk in the mining sector lost heaps
of money as property prices crashed and they had to pay or sale properties
valued at much lower than the buying price.
Like any financial undertaking, you can only do
your homework – research what you are looking for and how to get there. Risks
are part of life. But what you can’t do is blame the majority of older people
in society.
It is true though that the pattern of home ownership do indicate some
shifts. But this is a subject that needs to be properly analysed rather than
opt for modern divisive politics of ageism. For what is worth though, some
readers may still be interested in how the home ownership pattern variation
looks like. I have jotted some bullet point I extracted from the Australian Institute
of Health and Welfare data.
Statistical Extract Summary Home
Ownership
- About two-thirds or 67% of Australian residents are home owners
- 32% owned homes outright and 35% had a mortgage
- 32% are home renters
- In 1971 young people 25-29 years of age home ownership stood at 50%, by last 2016 Census had reduced to 37%
- In 1971, 30-34 years of age had home ownership rates of 64%, going down to 50% by 2016 Census – a 14% decrease
- For Australians aged 25–29, home ownership stood at 50% in 1971, decreasing to 37% in 2016.
- Those aged 50-54 experienced a 6.6% in home ownership declining from 80% to 74%. (Source: Australian Government, AIHW, 7 August 2020)
Links
Across Australia
there are various First Home Owner’s schemes and Government loans administered
through State and Territory Governments. In addition, there are now also State
and Federal stimulus subsidy monies to support home buyers that are new to the housing
market. These links offer examples; you research yourself to see what else is
available in your State.
Keystart - Western Australia
Keystart is a West
Australian Government scheme offering loans and only requires a deposit of 2%.
More so, this scheme does not require you to pay a lender's mortgage insurance.
Detailed info as per link: https://www.keystart.com.au/
Western Australia
also runs a specific scheme designed for farmers and rural and regional
business as per link: https://www.keystart.com.au/loans/rural-home-loan
First Home Owner Grant - Western Australia
A
Government payment of $10,000 is available to first
time home buyers. This subsidy can be accessed by citizens and permanent
residents regardless of your level of income. It is intended to encourage
people gain entry into housing ownership and establish their principal place of
residence. Detailed Grant conditions and requirements as per links:
West Australia Building Bonus Grant for New Home - $20,000
The WA Building Bonus
Grant at $20,000 is strictly
available from June 2020 to December 2020 as part of State economic stimulus
measures. The Grant is ‘available to promote investment in the WA
residential market and stimulate jobs in the construction industry’
regardless of your income level. For more detailed info follow the link:
Australian Federal Government Home
Builder Grant $25,000
The Federal Home Builder program offers $25,000 for building or purchasing new homes or undertaking major
renovations across all of Australia. The program is managed through each State
and Territory entities. As this is part of COVID economic stimulus or recovery
measure, the scheme access is restricted to the period June 2020 to December
2020. Here are web links to this scheme:
Homestart – South Australia
HomeStart is a South Australia State Government scheme intended to encourage
people achieve their home ownership dream. It offers a range of loans and helps
you steer away from paying Lender Mortgage Insurance. The scheme is accessible
to citizen, permanent resident or skilled migrant. For more info, see the
program link: https://www.homestart.com.au/
First Home Owners Grant $ 15,000 –
South Australia
This
is for first home buyers in SA ‘which can be put toward your deposit, fees and
charges.’ Details as per link http://www.revenuesa.sa.gov.au/grants-and-concessions/first-home-owners
Queensland First Home Owner’s Grant
This Queensland program only requires 2% deposit and
saves you from making mortgage insurance payments, and there no account keeping
fees. It is accessible eligible Australian citizen or permanent resident. Detail scheme info as per
link: https://www.qld.gov.au/housing/buying-owning-home/financial-help-concessions/qld-housing-finance-loan
Other explanatory program links
Australian Government, Home Builder. Economic Response to
Coronavirus, Fact Sheet: https://treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-06/Fact_sheet_HomeBuilder_0.pdf
Government of Western Australia, Media Statement: https://www.mediastatements.wa.gov.au/Pages/McGowan/2020/06/Building-Bonus-to-support-economic-recovery-and-create-WA-jobs.aspx
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)