Monday, 24 August 2020

Bureaucracy on Spotlight – Ruby Princess & Victoria Covid-19 Hotel Quarantine Inquiries

The Victoria Hotel COVID Quarantine fiasco and the Ruby Princess disembarkation debacle bring the workings of bureaucracy into spotlight. This saga agonised Australia and perhaps reinforced some of our regional hard border mentalities. Let’s face it - if bureaucracy makes certain decisions that don’t make sense, who can blame the public for exercising a healthy degree of cynicism?

I point out examples from both State and Federal bureaucracies. Let’s start with disembarkation issues.

The first thing that struck me is the story that NSW and the Feds have arrangements that apparently require a Federal Border Force Officer to interpret medical reports and make decisions about traveller movements in place of a qualified Public Health Officer.

People hear this stuff and they think are you kidding me? What sense can a Border Force Officer make of medical lingo? How does this help with Australia health safety? Where are NSW Health authorities?

The Commissioner of Inquiry into the Ruby Princess Cruiser rightly put the responsibility on NSW Health Department. Not even the “Yes Minister” British classic would have prepared us for what was to play out in real life leading to 663 known COVID infections and 28 dead. First NSW Health Department did not follow its own regulation framework – it chose not to require the Ruby Princess passengers to isolate. As the Commissioner of Inquiry put it:


13.64 The directive to allow passengers to onward travel interstate and internationally after disembarkation on 19 March did not appropriately contemplate or comply with the terms of the Public Health Order that came into effect on 17 March, which required all cruise ship passengers entering the State from any other country to isolate themselves in suitable accommodation for 14 days. Under the terms of the Public Health Order, the State Government should have arranged suitable accommodation for all passengers who were not residents of the State. See Inquiry Link
NSW Health Department also allowed passengers to take further travel despite knowing some of these travellers were either infected or close contact of those infected beggars belief. In turn the travellers infected many other people as they journeyed on interstate and around the world. The Inquiry Report observes:
‘’13.65 The fact sheet linked to an email sent to passengers at 10:46am on 20 March incorrectly advised that they were permitted to continue with onward travel, despite being identified as “close contacts” of a confirmed COVID-19 case. Although this advice was corrected by NSW Health by the evening of 21 March, it was at that stage too late to prevent a considerable number of interstate and international passengers from onward travelling, including some passengers who were symptomatic during transit.” See Inquiry Link
But also bear in mind that even many passengers had no idea that their luxury cruise liner had some infected people. So sadly many of them infected others unaware of their own situation – this is because NSW Health did not promptly warn them that they were disembarking from an infected ship.

Now back to Federal bureaucracy: Australian Border Force refused to provide Qantas and Virgin Airlines with the Ruby Princess Passenger Manifest despite requests from these airlines. In other words, if relevant airline staff had access to the list of passengers from the Ruby Princess they would have prevented them from boarding aircrafts and spreading Coronavirus interstate and around the world.

According to the ABC, “Six months after the Ruby Princess docked in Sydney, a formal process for sharing passenger manifests with those who need them has not been established.” ABC Link

If this is the case, what is senior Federal and State bureaucracy doing to ensure that health information is shared on ‘need-to-know base’ where broader public safety is at risk?

Then there are issues about bureaucracy not prioritising prompt swab-processing and communicating results from the Ruby Princess. And just letting passengers transfer to airport terminals and the like; then raising alarm when it is almost too late and most people have long moved on. Even after the Inquiry, this does not make sense. People puzzle that how does this stuff happen given some obvious public sector standards and so called values?

Is this the same healthcare bureaucracy expected to support manage safe inter-state border movements if these are opened prematurely? Follow the drift?

Common folk look at the Ruby Princess disembarkation mismanagement - even before the Inquiry Report came out, and they reason that it was a disaster waiting to happen. Yet bureaucracy took the view that “privacy” was absolute. Why didn’t NSW State Health request passengers to sign consent forms for health info to be shared on “need-to-know basis”? Why is this situation different from patient health info that is shared everyday around the country on “need-to-know basis”?

Individual safety we presume is one of the most paramount value or principle in public health. So when healthcare bureaucrats make perplexing decisions leading to substantial covid-19 spread as was the case with the Ruby Princess, it is no wonder people remain troubled. Why did bureaucracy not exercise its professional responsibility? Are we to take it that this was a political decision and bureaucrats had no say? If not, what went wrong?

Again when people think about border closures or relaxing them, I presume this kind of saga comes to mind. It has become part of our archaeology of memory for now.

Disembarkation issues are not isolated. Back in July the media reported about Jetstar passengers who arrived in NSW from Melbourne, disembarked and headed home without covid-19 screening. Apparently NSW State Health Officials were not available. Here is SMH Story Link

Aren’t these bureaucrats meant to be at the airport to screen passengers in a timely way? Were they swamped with workloads? Are they under-resourced? What measures are in place across other airports across the country to ensure Public Health Officers conduct their traveller screenings in a timely way and monitor that no arrivals fall through the cracks?


On the Victoria Hotel Quarantine saga - I was listening to the unfolding news. Among other things it sounds as if the quarantine roles are so fragmented and confused.

Now, I understand some of our neo-liberal bureaucratic requirements to put out services to tenders and contracts. Surely if Victoria Health Department wished to fragment the operational tasks that way; then those dividing up these tasks will need to be across the nitty gritty of your tender specifications and capabilities of contracted external parties.

If authorities involved in business contracting and compliance in delivery have limited idea of what was to occur at hotel quarantine sites from a health point of view, no wonder there were gaps in infection controls.

It looks like against the background of neo-liberal bureaucratic structures, perhaps bureaucrats focussed on doing their own fragmented bits. It is not even clear from the Victoria Premier’s press conferences there was no Lead Agency to provide oversight on health matters that cut across the board amongst multiple Government Departments involved at Hotel Quarantine sites.

As we move forward we can now only watch how the workings of bureaucracy evolve. It still seems a puzzle given the role confusion, dysfunctional diffusion, role fragmentation and lack of trained professional support and oversight (ala untrained security guards). To this you can add the seemingly avoidance of sensitive responsibilities (ala doing nothing just letting people disembark from the Ruby Princess regardless of consequences).

On one hand they say accountability and probity is part of what drives modern bureaucracy. Yet in both the Ruby Princess and Victoria Hotel Quarantine situation, we missed the mark. Perhaps The Commissioner of Inquiry into Ruby Princess is right to puzzle that what recommendations can he make when the findings are that these public servants need to actually do their basic job?

The other question of course is the environment these public servants find themselves in – who is to say. Are they able to do their job properly and survive? We live in a complex world.

Oops, one more thing. The Commissioner of Inquiry into the Victoria Hotel Quarantine saga draws attention that the Victoria Government named its Hotel Quarantine Plan as “Operation Soteria”. She goes on to say “Soteria is the Greek goddess of rescue and safety” See Day 3 Proceedings, Page 22, section 40. At this point I chuckled a little and likely inside trembled, thought to myself run fast to the safety in the God of Abraham, eternal and temporal.

Links
Special Commission of Inquiry into the Ruby Princess, New South Wales Australia

Victoria Covid-19 Hotel Quarantine Inquiry





Monday, 17 August 2020

Housing Ownership Debate & Subsidies


Australia has seen a growing debate about housing ownership and a claim that older Australians had it easy – and that should be blamed for intergenerational inequity. I am keen to touch on flaws of this claim – I am also keen to draw attention to current Government housing funding subsidies for people interested in housing ownership.

There are Government schemes across Australia put in place to give people a chance to pursue a dream of owning their own home. At the moment substantial additional money has been allocated to extra housing ownership subsidy programs as part of economic stimulus following the COVID disruption. I summarised resource links at the end of the article.

It has been estimated that some people could get as much as $69,000 and others up to $45,000 in total if they take advantage of the COVID stimulus economic housing package and the existing First Home Owners schemes. That is a lot of money for employed folk wishing to own their first home.

                
Clearly there are valid questions about housing inequality evidenced in homelessness and limited social housing for vulnerable groups. That deserves a separate article at another time. So now I turn my attention against the ageist assertions blaming elderly people.

I find it puzzling when I hear commentators claiming that older Australians managed themselves into home ownership with less effort. I think really?

First it is not clear which exact older Australian group they are blaming. Is it the older people now probably in aged care that missed out on public funded University education? Is it the very older women who back in the day were legally prevented from public sector jobs the minute they got married with impacts on lifelong earnings and savings?

Are we blaming the same older Australians who did not have the right to receive universal compulsory superannuation? We can’t forget that many Australians had no access to super until mid-1992. As of 1974 only 32% of Australia’s workforce had access to super. And of these only 15% were females. https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BN/0910/ChronSuperannuation

The point I am trying to make here is that a lot of those elderly people missed out on other things that we now take for granted like university education, superannuation, and even Government jobs that once largely excluded many women!

Many didn’t give up; they build on what they had and the opportunities that they secured. So to simply blame these people for vagaries of modern capitalism or the project of neo-liberalism seems to me a bit of a stretch!!

Then there are plenty of immigrants who came to Australia since the late 1970s from all over the world, many with nothing more than a suitcase. Many have toiled in low end jobs. Some have prospered running market gardens, restaurants, and involvement in mainstream economy. Try telling these people who worked no end to put food on the table for their families that they should be blamed for intergenerational inequities. It may not make sense.

I think people could be excused for thinking hey, we may need more advances in sociological explanations (laugh out loud), because a sweeping blame on older generations just doesn’t add up.

Specifically on housing, there are any older Australians who started in fibro housing and others albeit with a brick façade. Many home owners don’t get a mortgage to buy a house where they could live forever - they stick with a property for three, five or say 10 years. They shift to a better house or suburb after building greater equity in the house. In the past we have regarded building equity in your house as important part of a saving strategy – the equity allowed you to get an even better place – maybe another mortgage!

They got another mortgage? Housing was partly seen as a saving strategy as much a form of upward mobility.

My memory takes me back to the 1980s and 1990s as house renovations exploded. Holiday time and long weekends were partly spent by some doing painting projects, doing bathroom tiling and kitchen upgrades. You needed a bit of money to get improvement supplies. Remember WA Salvages (before Bunnings) for renovation supplies to make your little place look a ‘million dollars’? Time invested and work done increased house value.

People were busy ripping off old carpets and polishing their timber floors. It all took money, but it increased house value. A middle aged lady in the housing market once told me ‘she spent money to make money’ (laugh out loud, but I did understand her logic).

And wow, the amazing house extensions people built on their blocks. Sometimes extensions costed as much as the original structure. Then the fences that had to be redone, timber and fibro fences of post-ward era falling, Colorbond and Zincalume were in. Not cheap.

It will be remiss not to include the home gardening explosion that improved property values. So much gardening upgrades were made - plants bought and bartered – swap meet markets for early risers. Landscaping for those who could afford came in the mix. Time and money always gradually invested to bring gardens to new levels. And it all helped add value to properties.

Some will remember suburbs that did not have sewerage connections. You were required to pay to install a new sewerage connection and decommission old localised tank systems. And you couldn’t legally sell a property till a connection is done. Talk about cost of living! I know older people who only made their lifetime trip to Europe later in life. They were happy with local holidays, but certainly paid their mortgage.

The cost of money as in mortgage interest rates is also a big factor in talking about cost of housing. Needless to mention that the 1990s had seen interest rates ranging from 11% to 17%. Looking at comparative products on banking sites and Government housing loans today they roughly range from 2% to 4.6% interest. How does this compare to the 1990s 11% to 17% interest burden?

There are always risks with getting any mortgage to own a home. As in the recession of the early 1990s, some people lost properties. In recent years some well-paid folk in the mining sector lost heaps of money as property prices crashed and they had to pay or sale properties valued at much lower than the buying price.

Like any financial undertaking, you can only do your homework – research what you are looking for and how to get there. Risks are part of life. But what you can’t do is blame the majority of older people in society.

It is true though that the pattern of home ownership do indicate some shifts. But this is a subject that needs to be properly analysed rather than opt for modern divisive politics of ageism. For what is worth though, some readers may still be interested in how the home ownership pattern variation looks like. I have jotted some bullet point I extracted from the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare data.

Statistical Extract Summary Home Ownership
  • About two-thirds or 67% of Australian residents are home owners
  • 32% owned homes outright and 35% had a mortgage
  • 32% are home renters
  • In 1971 young people 25-29 years of age home ownership stood at 50%, by last 2016 Census had reduced to 37%
  • In 1971, 30-34 years of age had home ownership rates of 64%, going down to 50% by 2016 Census – a 14% decrease
  • For Australians aged 25–29, home ownership stood at 50% in 1971, decreasing to 37% in 2016.
  • Those aged 50-54 experienced a 6.6% in home ownership declining from 80% to 74%. (Source: Australian Government, AIHW, 7 August 2020) 

Links
Across Australia there are various First Home Owner’s schemes and Government loans administered through State and Territory Governments. In addition, there are now also State and Federal stimulus subsidy monies to support home buyers that are new to the housing market. These links offer examples; you research yourself to see what else is available in your State.

Keystart - Western Australia
Keystart is a West Australian Government scheme offering loans and only requires a deposit of 2%. More so, this scheme does not require you to pay a lender's mortgage insurance. Detailed info as per link: https://www.keystart.com.au/

Western Australia also runs a specific scheme designed for farmers and rural and regional business as per link: https://www.keystart.com.au/loans/rural-home-loan

First Home Owner Grant - Western Australia
A Government payment of $10,000 is available to first time home buyers. This subsidy can be accessed by citizens and permanent residents regardless of your level of income. It is intended to encourage people gain entry into housing ownership and establish their principal place of residence. Detailed Grant conditions and requirements as per links: 

West Australia Building Bonus Grant for New Home - $20,000
The WA Building Bonus Grant at $20,000 is strictly available from June 2020 to December 2020 as part of State economic stimulus measures. The Grant is ‘available to promote investment in the WA residential market and stimulate jobs in the construction industry’ regardless of your income level. For more detailed info follow the link: 

Australian Federal Government Home Builder Grant $25,000
The Federal Home Builder program offers $25,000 for building or purchasing new homes or undertaking major renovations across all of Australia. The program is managed through each State and Territory entities. As this is part of COVID economic stimulus or recovery measure, the scheme access is restricted to the period June 2020 to December 2020. Here are web links to this scheme:

Homestart – South Australia
HomeStart is a South Australia State Government scheme intended to encourage people achieve their home ownership dream. It offers a range of loans and helps you steer away from paying Lender Mortgage Insurance. The scheme is accessible to citizen, permanent resident or skilled migrant. For more info, see the program link: https://www.homestart.com.au/

First Home Owners Grant $ 15,000 – South Australia
This is for first home buyers in SA ‘which can be put toward your deposit, fees and charges.’ Details as per link http://www.revenuesa.sa.gov.au/grants-and-concessions/first-home-owners

Queensland First Home Owner’s Grant
This Queensland program only requires 2% deposit and saves you from making mortgage insurance payments, and there no account keeping fees. It is accessible eligible Australian citizen or permanent resident. Detail scheme info as per link: https://www.qld.gov.au/housing/buying-owning-home/financial-help-concessions/qld-housing-finance-loan

 

Other explanatory program links
Australian Government, Home Builder. Economic Response to Coronavirus, Fact Sheet: https://treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-06/Fact_sheet_HomeBuilder_0.pdf


Monday, 3 August 2020

Government Aged Care Covid Response – Growing Call for Analysis and Strategy


As Victoria’s Covid-19 crisis continues, it is in Australia’s interest that we reflect how we might deal better in preventing a spread and enhancing preparedness in dealing with any potential outbreak in the rest of the nation.

Previously lack of coordinated aged care response to Covid-19 had been cited by many commentators. The Government has now set up an Aged Care Response Centre drawing together Federal and State Government agencies, some professional associations and Peak bodies see here

This is intended to foster better and rapid response, including linkage with the hospital system and multidisciplinary teams. According to Federal and Victoria Governments announcements, the new coordinated system will better support communication with families including situations where a family work toward removing their elderly from aged care facility.

Over the last week I picked up on some interesting comments by Professor Joseph Ibrahim, Monash University and Professor Mary-Louise McLaws, Epidemilogist. The United Workers Union Survey expressing views of 1000 aged care workers is also great value, including comments made Carolyn Smith, President of United Workers Union.
Clearly more scrutiny seems necessary for optimal Covid-19 response within aged care homes.

Staff shortage is a recurring theme. Similarly, everyone seems to agree that the nursing homes have long and strongly relied on untrained casual workforce. Perversely, these nursing homes run without adequate registered nurses whose skills are essential to foster quality clinical and personal care.

So for those of us in Australian States that so far have contained Covid-19 spread, questions still remain – what are the aged care contingency workforce plans for the country that leaders have put in place over the last months of planning preparation? What do those plans look like and will be good for the public families with members in care to know. Let’s face it, the Victorian Premier Andrew recently said he did not have confidence in the majority of those private aged care homes in his state – and he would not put his mum in there!

The everyday picture from the ground highlights basic stuff that unless it is addressed in a systemic way, the potential for certain things to go wrong is there. Let’s look at some views of the United Workers Union surveyed 1000 nation-wide:
  • Close to a third of aged care workers did not get Covid-19 safety training including appropriate PPE use.
  • Concern of clear planned training schedule as stated “We did not get personal training about Covid-19, it was online. Half of the people didn’t even know there was training.”
  • Lacks good planning for workforce training that take account of the casual structure of the workforce
  • Over two-thirds felt not equipped to handle coronavirus outbreak
  • They see ‘Danger of cross infection’ I care settings
  • The majority of workers felt swamped by extra workloads
  • A massive 90 per cent of workers revealed not enough time is allocated to fully take care of their basic duties in providing personal care to the elderly
  • “We wake them up, put them in a chair, all day with no visitors, no extra staff and put them back to bed 8 hours later, with staff hardly getting a chance to talk to them….it’s not really care, I feel like a robot.”
  • “Some residents are going all day without staff even entering their rooms as there isn’t enough of us.”  
This survey concludes that there is absence of national preparedness seen in lack of strategy and plans to ensure the workforce was prepared, trained and equipped with safety protection measures.

My mind puzzled as to who is now overseeing aged care workforce development policy and strategy? I noted from my search that since the Feds abolished the Health Workforce Australia in 2014, apparently ‘the essential functions were transferred to the Department of Health(link).

But is the Department involved? Or did aged care workforce development become a casualty of neoliberal cut backs and doing away with Government planning?

Given recent events exposing staff shortage and neglect from having adequate registered nurses in nursing homes, it will be good to know who is responsible for workforce development policy and strategy for aged care.

Some of the highlights from ABC interviews with Professors Joseph Ibrahim and Professor Mary-Louise McLaws are really worthwhile following up, they give you another layer of complexity that needs to be fleshed out. It will be great to know how Governments are responding to the sorts of difficulties that these experts raise. Here are some key points they shared on ABC:
  • We ‘knew clinical care audits showed ability to manage infections was sub-optimal’
  • Decision makers ignored or overlooked the need to seek ‘expertise of people that work in the sector not just peak bodies’
  • Strangely Governments tasked the regulator of aged care services to manage the pandemic – this is a role misfit, and this body “don’t have sufficient senior clinical staff to inform pandemic response” in aged care.
  • The aged care built environment is not always suitable in tackling Covid-19
  • The built environment is not designed to minimise spread of infections
  • You need appropriately designed built environment to manage airflows – unlike hospitals, ‘aged care facilities are not up to that level’.
  • There are ‘no filters to prevent particles to escapeSo when you open door they escape’ to adjacent rooms with negative residents. So it spreads.
  • Strategy need to recognise that as things stand, nursing homes are structured as ‘shared spaces - these are like homes
  • Also important that there are ‘no shared staff at all’ working across residents with Covid-19 and those that are negative
  • These ‘Lessons need to be learnt again….. Newmarch, Spain, Italy, France, UK, Canada, USA – we should have been far advanced in planning and incidence control’
  • ‘Too many people involved and no one giving direction’

Call for analysis and strategy – How will Government respond?
Concerns from sector staff that they are not allocated adequate time to provide basic personal care, let alone deal with Covid19 issues. The Feds as funders and regulators, how do they deal with this issue in the short term & long term? What is the policy and strategy they use to underpin the funding and regulation framework?
  • Government are best advised to obtain additional expertise as suggested by experts mentioned above.
  • Built environment and challenge of managing cross infections in such settings – what is the strategy in dealing with challenge? Is this pro-actively discussed with families before outbreak occurs
  • What are available options (and risks) if there are families needing to evacuate their loved one prior and during Covid-19 outbreak; and overall communication strategy with families.
  • Who is the central person giving directions for aged care as some healthcare experts have asked?
  • What strategic measures across the country are put in place by Feds and sector providers to ensure we address risks of having support workers moving across multiple sites that involves contact with more vulnerable people?
  • Enhance sector preparedness in other states
  • Covid-19 safety training strategy needs attention
  • Is the Government planning any long term workforce development strategy or are we going to let the market continue its own way?  Put another way, here you can clearly see the limitations of adopting Thatcherism or Reaganomics! There are consequences.
  • Lessons learnt need to be shared by the Government as suggested by experts – this is essential for future learning, improvement and interrogation of facts and assumptions 

Reference Links
ABC, Afternoon Briefing Program, ABC Interviews Profs Joseph Ibrahim & Mary-Louise McLaws. 28 July 2020 https://iview.abc.net.au/show/afternoon-briefing/series/0/video/NU2020H103S00
ABC Radio, AM Program, Aged Care COVID-19 Survey Reveal Big Gaps in Preparations and Resources, 27 July 2020
Pandemic Failures in Aged Care Revealed in Survey, Media Release, United Workers Union. 27 July 2020 https://www.unitedworkers.org.au/pandemic-failures-in-aged-care-revealed-in-survey/
Department of Health, Health Workforce Australia Transition to the Department of Health. 21 June 2016. https://www1.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/hwa-archived-publications